INTERNET SOUNDS DEATH KNELL FOR USE TAXES:
STATES CONTINUE TO SCREAM OVER LOST REVENUES
The number of commercial web sites' and Internet2 use continues to
grow at an alarming rate. 3 With growth comes benefits and burdens.
I See Susan A. Dunn, Negotiating Web Site Agreements, 444 PRAc. L. INST. 467,
469 (1996) (defining web site as "a collection of files stored on a file server that is accessible to users of the World Wide Web, a network of servers and information available on
the Internet.").
2 See GEORGE S. MACHOVEC, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, NETWORKING AND
INTERNET
GLOSSARY 56 (1993) (defining Internet as "[tihe collection of networks that connect government, university, and commercial agencies ... any set of interconnected, logically
independent networks"); see also Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.2
[c
(6th Cir. 1996) (defining Internet by first explaining that: " lomputer networks are systems of interconnected computers that allow the exchange of information between computers. The Internet is the world's largest computer network, often described as a
'network of networks.'") (citations omitted); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937
F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996) (defining "[tihe Internet [as] a global communications
network linked principally by modems which transmit electronic data over telephone
lines"). Additionally, in PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen the court defined:
The Internet [as] an international computer 'super-network' ... used
by... individuals, corporations, organizations, and educational instituIn recent years, businesses have begun to use the
tions worldwide ....
Internet to provide information and products to consumers and other businesses. Every Internet user has a unique address consisting of one or more
This address is commonly referred to as the
address components.
'domain' or 'domain name.' On the Internet, domain names serve as the
primary identifier of the Internet user. Businesses on the Internet commonly use their business names (e.g., IBM) with the designation '.com'
(e.g., IBM.com) as their domain names. The designation '.com' identifies
the name holder as a commercial entity.
938 F. Supp. 616, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citation omitted).
Further, the Inset Systems court explained that:
[diomain addresses are similar to street addresses, in that it is through this
domain address that Internet users find one another. A domain address
consists of three parts: the first part identifies the part of the Internet desired such as world wide web (www), the second part is usually the name
of the company or other identifying words, and the third part identifies the
type of institution such as government (.gov) or commercial (.com), etc.
937 F. Supp. at 163; see also Richard P. Klau, Welcome to the Wide, Wie World of Domain Names, Trademarks and the Courts, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1997, at 14, 14
(explaining that domains are divided into two main categories: (1) "'top'-level" and (2)
"second-level" domains). As noted by Klau:
Internet 'top'-level domains are subdivided into several categories. The
'top'-level domains designate the type of organization involved. The most
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One such burden includes the possible decline of state use 4 taxes because

of the increased Internet usage for out-of-state purchases .
popular 'top'-level domains in the United States are " .com" (commercial),
".edu" (four-year educational institution), ".gov" (U.S. federal government), ".net" (Internet provider) and ".org" (a catch all, typically used for
non-profit organizations).
Id.

3 See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 163 (noting that the peak of Internet operators
reaches roughly 30 million); Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 618 (same); Vinton G. Cerf,
Research Pays Off (FederalResearch Budget Is Essential), 271 Sd. 1343, 1343 (1996)
(noting enormous Internet expansion); Division on the World Wide Web, 25 N.J. ST. TAX
NEws 3, 4-5 (1996) (noting that within roughly a half-year's time, the tax web site of
New Jersey had been viewed beyond 13,000 times and represents future expansion avenues for interchange); Dunn, supra note 1, at 469 (explaining that within recent years
commercial web sites have increased greatly); Joseph M. Fisher, Internet Seen as Means
of ProvidingLegal Notice, NAT'L L. J., July 1, 1996, at C3 (providing that Internet use
rate should grow by at least 50% in coming years, with operators approaching 40 million); Klau, supra note 2, at 14 (pointing out the explosive growth of domain sites, resulting in various litigation issues); John Newberry, Out-of-Office Experiences, A.B.A.J.,
Sept. 1996, at 54, 57 (explaining that web sites represent the wave of the future: "[ijf
you don't have it, it's going to be odd.'"); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Revolving
Jurisdictionand Venue on the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1996, at 3 (noting that recent
Internet growth correlates to a similar increase in Internet litigation); M. Mitchell Waldrop, Culture Shock On The Networks, 265 Sa. 879, 879 (1994) (same); Richard S.
Zembek, Comment, Jurisdictionand the Internet: Fundamental Fairnessin the Networked
World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TEcH. 339, 344 (1996) (providing rough estimate of on-line operators near a maximum of one hundred million).
4 See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing definition
of use tax and its
purposes).
See Internet Symposium: Legal Potholes Along the Information Superhighway, 16
Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 541, 572 (1996) (explaining the possibility of an eroding tax base
because of Internet sales). Speaker R. Scot Grierson explained that use and sales taxes
generate significant revenues. See id. at 573. Specifically, Grierson noted these types of
taxes account for $200 billion in annual revenues, approximately 35 % of state and local
government tax dollars. See id.
Additionally, the State of Texas provides a definite example of the potential hazards
a use tax presents within the Internet context. See John Sharp, Virtual Taxation: Electronic Commerce Poses Problems for State Tax Collections, Gov'T FIN. REV., Aug.,
1996, at 36, 36 (explaining that Texas' use tax accounts for greater than half the total tax
dollars). In 1994, Texas lost $235 million in use taxes within the mail-order context. See
id. at 37.
This problem continues as a result of out-of-state Internet purchases. See id. at 36,
37 (noting that the explosive Internet growth effectively will render mail-order catalogs
obsolete, as the Internet is more cost effective and attractive to customers who buy spontaneously). Further, recently a multitude of companies now advertise their products via
the Internet. See id. at 36. Tax experts estimate that by the turn of the century, Internet
sales may reach $7 billion. See id. Similarly by the year 2000, approximately one million companies are expected to be marketing products via the Internet. See id. Sharp
explains this skyrocketing growth represents a possible intangible revenue source; this
"'virtual mall'" represents a pseudo "'storefront'" enabling "users to browse through
catalogs." See id. at 37; see also Kaye K. Caldwell, Solving State and Local Use Tax
Collection Problems, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 185, 185 (1996) (discussing that the crux of
the use tax problem lies in out-of-state purchases); Comments on the Effect of Tax Reform
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"Use taxes are imposed on the privilege of ownership of possession,
storage, use or consumption of goods in the state ... [and are] collected
on items bought in another state but used in the taxing state."
The use
tax compliments a particular state's sales tax by attempting to ensure

taxation of a particular transaction. 7 The main purpose of this tax is to
avoid decreasing tax revenues. s The majority of states impose use taxes
in addition to their sales taxes. 9 The crux of the ?roblem, however, lies
with use tax collection, resulting in lost revenues.
on State and Local Governments, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 253, 254 (1996) (noting that during 1994, use and sales taxes accounted for 33% of "the 50 states combined"); Commerce on the 'Net Poses Knotty Tax Issues, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 1996, at 5 (noting that
states want to assure their Internet revenue streams, which may reach a billion dollars in
annual revenues).
6 ALL STATES TAX GUIDE
5003, at 5011 (1994) (emphasis added); see also JEROME
R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, I1 STATE TAXATION,
22.06121[b], at 22-41 to
-42 (1992) (defining use tax as "'any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by,
sales, receipts from sales, purchases, storage or use of tangible personal property'")
(quoting 4 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1985)); R. Scot Grierson, ConstitutionalLimitations on State
Taxation: Sales and Use Tax Nexus on the Information Highway, 10 STATE TAX NOTES
589, 589 (1996) (noting that a use tax supplements a sales tax that otherwise would lack
constitutional authority for its imposition); "Tax-Free" Shopping, 25 N.J. ST. TAX NEWs
3, 15 (1996) (examining use tax question regarding whether purchases made in Delaware
and brought back to New Jersey were truly "tax free"). Specifically, the article explained:
[While purchases made in Delaware are not subject to any sales tax in
Delaware, they are not 'tax free' for New Jersey residents. When goods
that are not tax-exempt in New Jersey are brought into this State for use
here, the user must pay a 'compensating use tax' to New Jersey. The requirement of paying use tax has been part of the Sales and Use Tax Act
since 1966. See N.J. [STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-6 (West 1986 & Supp.
1996)]. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that out-of-state purchases of goods used mainly in the State are subject to the same tax liability as purchases of the identical items within the State. Residents cannot
avoid sales tax simply by crossing State lines. Coppa v. Taxation Div.
Dir., 8 NJ. Tax 236, 252 ([N.J.] Tax Ct. 1986).
Id. (emphases added). Additionally, the article pointed out two ways to comply with use
tax obligations owed. See id. First, a taxpayer can voluntarily pay within a certain number of days upon returning and filing to his or her domiciled state Form ST-18. See id.
Alternatively, payment may be delayed until the taxpayer files his or her annual state return. See id.; see also Appendices A-C (providing New Jersey State tax return, detailing
line 40 for "use" tax computation (Appendix A); directions for computation (Appendix
B); and form ST-18 (Appendix C)).
7 See ALL STATES TAX GUIDE, supra note 6,
at 5011.
8 See id. There are four main purposes of a use tax:
first, the obvious purpose involves an additional revenue source; second, to eliminate avoidance of sales tax by simply making purchases in a different state; third, to achieve a fair balance between state
and federal taxes; and fourth, to alleviate discrimination. See id.; see also Grierson, supra note 6, at 589 (explaining that an equal playing field is achieved with use taxes,
which should discourage out-of-state purchases that attempt to save tax dollars).
9 See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS at 398-406
(Richard A. Leiter ed., 1993)
(providing that Alaska, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon represent the minority of
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State and local governments should not burden their respective citizens to ensure collection of use taxes that relate to purchases of tangible
personal property through commercial web sites. This would only further complicate state tax returns. Individual taxpayers should not be required to ascertain whether they must pay and calculate a use tax on their
out-of-state Internet purchases. Instead, collection at the time of sale
better ensures states their much-needed revenues.'" Congressional legislation should determine the specific companies that must comply. 12
To better illustrate a transaction implicating a use tax, a hypothetical
factual scenario13 within the Internet must first be assumed. Elite Computers, Inc. manufactures and directly sells computers. It became incorporated in Oregon and opened for business early in January 1996. Elite's
manufacturing operations and principal place of business are also located
in Oregon, which does not have a use tax. No operations, sales force, or
distributions of catalogs are outside of this state. Realizing the cost effectiveness and potential huge market outside of Oregon, Elite established
a web site to market and place credit-card orders for its computers. Elite
only charged for the cost of the computer, as its policy was not to collect
and remit use taxes to applicable states.
At the close of the 1996 fiscal year, Elite's sales exceeded $2 billion. Two-thirds of this amount, approximately $1.3 billion, originated
from sales from states other than Oregon. Further, New Jersey, which
does have a use tax,1 4 alone accounted for $5 million.
Customer X, a New Jersey resident, is an avid computer aficionado.
Needing a new laptop, yet desperately wanting to avoid a New Jersey
sales tax and not realizing the use tax self-assessment requirements,
states that do not impose a use tax). Further, of the majority of states that do impose use
taxes, the tax percentages range between two and seven. See id.
IO See ALL STATES TAX GUIDE, supra note 6, at 5011 (noting that questions often
arise over collection of use taxes); Caldwell, supra note 5, at 185; Betsy Dotson, MailOrder Sales: GFOA and Coalition Petition the Federal Trade Commission, Gov'T FIN.
REV., Aug. 1, 1996, at 46, 47 (explaining that most customers are unaware of use tax
obligations, e.g., a recent Florida survey demonstrated that upwards of 40% of customers
fail to realize tax implications of mail-order sales); Commerce on the 'Net Poses Knotty
Tax Issues, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining the real problem lies in collection of the use
tax); Grierson, supra note 6, at 589 (illustrating that collection becomes an issue as states
must rely on willing taxpayer assent, or require nonresident companies to accumulate and
submit the use taxes).
11 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing use tax amounts
as percentages of total revenues and example of losses that currently have resulted due to use
taxes).
12 See Commerce on the 'Net Poses Knotty Tax Issues, supra note 5, at 7.
13 This assumed factual scenario [hereinafter Hypothetical] is referred to throughout
this Comment.
14 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-6 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
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Customer X surfs the Internet. Customer X is thrilled at Elite's seemingly rock-bottom price and impulsively gives his credit card number.
Within a week the computer is delivered. Customer X is extremely excited and pleased with the tax saving. Unfortunately, two weeks later,
Customer X's computer crashes. After Elite refused to fix the computer,
Customer X is in tears and consults a lawyer. Customer X files suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Moreover, New Jersey's additional efforts to require Elite to collect and remit
use taxes to its state failed.15 As a result, the State of New Jersey has
intervened as plaintiffs.
This Comment focuses on the collection of use taxes that relate to
the purchase of tangible personal property through commercial web sites
over the Internet.'
Part I presents the constitutional obstacles to be
overcome before states may subject nonresident companies to use taxes.
Part II discusses administrative feasibility of imposing use taxes and possible federal legislation to alleviate an otherwise Commerce Clause violation. Finally, Part III concludes that congressional action is necessary to
limit future litigation. Absent congressional guidelines, states will continually try to expand the concept of physical presence attempting to
avoid a Commerce Clause violation and require nonresident companies to
collect and remit use taxes.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES

The United States Supreme Court recently addressed a similar use
tax collection Problem within the mail-order context in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota. The facts of Quill involved North Dakota's attempt to
require Quill Corp., a nonresident mail-order company that has no offices
or personnel in North Dakota, to collect and remit use tax revenues on
products acquired for utilization within North Dakota." Although the
Court ultimately found a violation of the Commerce Clause, 19 no Due
Process Clause z° violation occurred. 2 1 Quill's constitutional analyses and

15

The State of New Jersey's attempts were in addition to voluntary taxpayer compli-

ance.
16

See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.

17

504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).

18 See id. (emphasis added); see also National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967) (involving similar facts); infra notes 19-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the Quill Court's reasoning and outcome).
19 See infra notes 45-71 and accompanying text for Commerce Clause analysis.
20 See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text for due process analysis.
21

See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308, 317-18. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first

analyzed due process concerns prior to addressing interstate commerce issues. See id. at
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reasoning similarly applies to use tax collection within the Internet arena.

Specifically, the following three issues must be examined: (1) whether
an out-of-state company's web site comports with due process; 22 (2) does
the Commerce Clause still present an insurmountable obstacle to requiring out-of-state companies to collect and remit use taxes; 23 and (3) if an
interstate violation is found, may and should Congress waive this violation .24
A.

25
Does a Single Web Site Comport with Due Process?

The issue of due process 26 often arises within the personal jurisdiction context, as it relates to states' attempts to require nonresident companies to collect and remit applicable use taxes.2 7 The Quill Court realized that since 1967 there has been considerable change concerning due
process law.
Resolution of this issue depends on whether a nonresident
defendant "[has] certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair

306, 309. The Justice noted, however, that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses
have different purposes. See id. at 305. Specifically, Justice Stevens explained that:
The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally, in several
ways .... [While Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce
among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate
commerce, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315
(1945), it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the
Due Process Clause.
Id.
22 For due process violation analysis see infra notes 25-44.
23 For Commerce Clause analysis see infra notes 45-71.
24 For waiver of Commerce Clause violation see infra notes 57-71.
25 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
26 See JOSEPH W.

GLANNON,

CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 3-5

(2d ed. 1992). Specifically, Glannon explained:
A state would violate [due process protection] if its courts entered judgments against defendants without following a fair judicial procedure, and
fair procedure includes not only such traditional elements as the right to
counsel or to cross-examine witnesses, but also appropriate limits on the
places where a defendant can be required to defend a lawsuit.
Id. at 3 (emphases added).
Additionally, Glannon continued his due process explanation by examining the
"minimum contacts" analysis. See id.at 4 (explaining a court examines the character of
the state connections to answer whether jurisdiction is proper).
27 See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). To
ascertain whether a defendant has been properly subjected to judicial jurisdiction, a court
must find that the following two requirements are satisfied: (1) the particular state's longarm statute and (2) the constitutional requirement of due process. See id. For purposes
of this Comment, however, only the due process issue will be explored.
28 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
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Building on the historical standard of

International Shoe, the Quill majority acknowledged that the minimum
contacts standard30 must be evaluated against the backdrop of
"reasonableness."
Physical presence is no longer a necessity; rather,
the inquiry centers around whether a nonresident company deliberately
seized financial rewards from the litigation state. 31

Accordingly, the

29 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Milliken v.
Meer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote:
In [the] spirit [of International Shoe], we have abandoned more formalistic
tests that have focused on a defendant's 'presence' within a State in favor
of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.
Id. (emphasis added); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority read International
Shoe conservatively); Zembek, supra note 3, at 351 (explaining that the International
Shoe standard permits jurisdictional capacity of the states to be enlarged).
Additionally, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, enumerated factors to determine reasonableness:
'mhe burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute,' 'the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.'
471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
31 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. Specifically, the Court posited:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the
defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial
presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a
State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which
business is conducted.
So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
personal jurisdiction there.
Id. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476) (emphases added); see also WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (explaining that due process is not offended in circumstances where the facts demonstrate a company transports goods within an established
trading market with anticipation that those very same goods will be bought by patrons of
the state in which litigation pursues); Zembek, supra note 3, at 352-53 (laying-out a threepart test to ascertain the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction).
Compare Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762, 766 (Il. 1961)
(holding an Ohio valve manufacturer liable for suit in Illinois based on stream of commerce theory) with Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 106, 112-13
(1987) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality) (reasoning that simply positioning company goods
within an established trading market fails to constitute deliberate actions geared at the
state in which suit proceeds; accordingly, the facts indicated that a Japanese producer
should not be required to defend a suit in California because of the unfairness).
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Quill Court reasoned that Quill Corporation
definitely focused its market32
citizenry.
Dakota
North
at
ing efforts
Courts have recently revisited the issue of due process, deciding the
cases upon independent factual inquiries.3 3 For example, Compuserve,

Inc. v. Pattersonrepresents a matter of first impression to the Sixth Circuit. 34 In Compuserve, defendant Patterson, a resident of Texas, entered
into a software agreement with Compuserve, Inc., which is headquartered
in Ohio. 35 Defendant's sole contacts with Ohio were over the Internet.3 6
The Sixth Circuit recognized the ability of the Internet to greatly expand
a company's potential market far beyond a single state's border. 37 Ac32

See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. Specifically, the Court recognized the significance of

Quill's yearly solicitation for its goods by mailing advertising into North Dakota. See id.
at 304; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text for the factual situation of Quill's
mail-order business.
Justice Stevens analysis continued by explaining that Quill Corporation had adequate
notice that its business procedures may expose it to suit in a different state. See Quill,
504 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Court enunciated the North Dakota Supreme Court's reasoning for not
requiring physical presence. See id. at 301. As highlighted by the Justice Stevens, the
North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the enormous legal modernization within the
prior twenty-five years has caused the requirement of physical presence to become outmoded. See id. In agreement, the Supreme Court concluded its due process analysis by
stating that today due process elements are satisfied despite a company's absence in the
state taxing forum. See id. at 308.
33 See Compuserve, 89 F.3d at 1259-60 (involving the Internet);
Panavision Int'l v.
Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162-63 (D. Conn. 1996) (same); Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Highway Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825, 825 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(involving advertisement in national publication); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct
Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1351-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (involving computer
terminals used by travel agent).
34 See Compuserve, 89 F.3d at 1262. Writing for the majority,
Judge Brown explained:
This case presents a novel question of first impression: Did Compuserve
make a prima facie showing that contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process
Clause, to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
[the defendant]?
Id. (emphases added).
3 See id. at 1260.
36 See id. Specifically, Compuserve enters into agreements with customers to afford
them Internet opportunities. See id. Additionally, Compuserve serves as an Internet
medium that enables its customers to purchase computer merchandise. See id. This suit
originated from the contract entered into with Compuserve, where defendant Patterson
marketed his software via the Internet. See id.
37 See id. at 1262. Specifically, the Compuserve court stated that:
The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of
these historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right
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cordingly, the court decided that the parties' Internet 38interactions were
substantial enough to withstand a due process challenge.

Similarly, Inset Systems involved the Internet, where the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut found that the defendant's actions were enough that due process was not offended by requir-

ing the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, to litigate in Connecticut's foreign jurisdiction. 39 The Inset Systems court's conclusion relied
upon the defendant's purposeful establishment of a web site to advertise
over the Internet, effectively reaching beyond Massachusetts into the

Connecticut market. 4°
equipment and knowledge- that is, people like [defendant] Patterson- to
operate an internationalbusiness cheaply, and from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled to the protection of the Due
Process Clause, which mandates that potential defendants be able 'to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
the conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.' World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 [ ]. Thus, this case presents a situation
where we must reconsiderthe scope of our jurisdictional reach.
Id. (emphases added). See also Zembek, supra note 3, at 343, explaining that the vital
asset of the Internet is its capacity to shrink the globe, effectively drawing Internet customers closer together.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit explained the decreased need for federal due process
protection (relating to annoying suits), given the advances in technology and transportation. Compuserve, 89 F.3d at 1262. Further, the court emphasized the parties continuous contact. See id.at 1265. Judge Brown explained that purposeful availment is determined by contact nature. See id. Lastly, the court determined the fairness of
subjecting the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. See id.at 1267-68 (finding this requirement satisfied because of the material bond between the parties).
38 See Compuserve, 89 F.3d at 1263 (concluding that the Due
Process Clause failed
to be offended; finding defendant Patterson deliberately reached beyond Texas advertising
his software by utilizing Compuserve as the major hub).
39 See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162, 165 (D. Conn.
1996). The dispute herein centered around an alleged trademark infringement. See id. at
162-63. The plaintiff, Inset, conducted operations primarily within Connecticut; whereas,
defendant (ISI) operated the same within Massachusetts. See id. Further, ISI supplied
computer services worldwide, however, it had no operations or employees within Connecticut. See id. ISI seized "'INSET.COM' as its Internet domain address," which it
utilized for product marketing. See id; see also supra note 2 (defining domain and giving
examples).
In addressing the due process issue, Judge Covello correctly stated that the answer
depends on all the present facts before the court. See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165.
Specifically, the judge explained that the "'due process inquiry rests upon the totality of
the circumstances rather than any mechanical criteria....'" Id. (quoting Combustion
Eng'g, Inc. v. NEI Int'l Combustion, Ltd., 798 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D. Conn. 1992)
(emphasis added)).
See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. The Inset Systems court determined that the
reasonableness requirement was satisfied. See id.(finding that proficient settlement results by allowing litigation to proceed in Connecticut). Further, the court reasoned:
[ISI] has directed its advertising activities via the Internet... toward not
only the [SItate of Connecticut, but to all states. The Internet... [is] de-
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The hypothetical scenario posed earlier, 4' is analogous to Compuserve, Inset Systems, and Quill. At a minimum, a company that establishes a web site in addition to the Quill facts cannot win a due process
challenge in a foreign state.4 2
The real issue, however, is whether Elite's single web site and lack
of operations and sales force outside of Oregon can subject it to suit in a
New Jersey federal court. The Compuserve and Inset Systems courts'
conclusions suggest that given the correct factual situation, a web site
may indeed withstand due process scrutiny.
Despite the fact that Elite's
operations are solely within Oregon, the company's marketing efforts
were of a nationwide scope. Utilizing a sole web site to market its computers, Elite effectively generated sales that were primarily outside of its
resident state of Oregon.
signed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state.
Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users
within Connecticut alone. Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike
television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously
to any Internet user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business within Connecticut.
Id. (emphases added). Cf Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618,
621-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (denying defendant's motion to quash, explaining that within this
tort context, a defendant that deliberately directs activity toward the forum state is liable,
because the sole purpose for establishing the web site was to hinder people from Internet
transactions unless states received prior remuneration); Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v.
Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825, 825, 830 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (granting
defendant's motion to transfer for a contract dispute, reasoning that absent greater contact
than a sole defendant's advertisement within a national magazine, due process is not satisfied); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1033-34,
1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting plaintiff's motion for contempt, finding that a prior,
permanent injunction to not market defendant's magazine within the United States was
violated by later marketing the product over the Internet). But see Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint, reasoning that the record was void of allegations that the defendant attempted to
solicit customers outside the state in which they were located); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System
One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(reversing the district court's decision, finding that the facts failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of requiring the defendant to litigate a lease dispute in Florida, when establishment and service was solely within New York).
41 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
42 See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text discussing Quill. Specifically, the
Quill Court ruled that a company conducting a mail-order business, purposely mailing
numerous catalogs into a nonresident state, comports with due process. See Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1992). Accordingly, a company having both a
mail-order business similar to Quill Corporation's and a web site will sustain a due process challenge.
43 See Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260, 1268-69 (6th
Cir. 1996)
(reversing a district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction because Internet
contacts were sufficient to withstand a due process challenge); Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at
165 (finding due process satisfied because defendant's Internet actions were purposefully
focused toward another nonresident state).
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Specifically, greater than two-thirds of its first-year sales, approximately $1.3 billion, came from residents beyond Oregon's borders. New
Jersey alone accounted for $5 million. Realizing the Internet's cost efficiency and global reach, Elite purposely established its web site to reach
beyond Oregon and it reaped the resulting financial benefits. It was
Elite's initial decision that enabled the transaction to occur in the first
place because it offered the goods. 44 The significant quality and continuous nature of the above contacts, in light of today's technologically advanced society, lead to the conclusion that subjecting Elite to jurisdiction
in New Jersey is reasonable. Accordingly, the outer-limits of our Constitution's Due Process Clause are flexible enough to encircle Elite's actions, allowing suit to proceed within New Jersey.
B. Does the Commerce Clause Present an Insurmountable
Obstacle to Requiring Out-of-State Companies to Collect and
Remit Use Taxes.?5
46
In analyzing the Commerce Clause, the Quill majority relied on
the importance of maintaining an unambiguous use tax law and stare de-

cisis. 4

Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens began the Commerce

48
Clause analysis by quoting the Constitution for the origin of its powers.

44 But see Richard K. Herrmann, Crossing the Virtual Line on the Internet, Spring

1996, at 8 (finding that the recipient initiates the link of Internet connections). The significant fact remains, however, that without the web site to present the offer, there would
be no opportunity for a recipient to accept. See id.
45 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
46 See generally STEVEN L. EMANUEL, EMANUEL LAW OUTLINES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 27-28 (13th ed. 1995) (explaining the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause
and how it involves regulations between the various states).
47 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990)
]
(defining stare decisis as the "[p olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not disturb settled point"). But despite the fact that Quill's majority decided to use stare decisis as an

additional reason for its decision, subsequent cases and commentators indicate the point is
anything but settled.
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. Specifically, the Court began by stating:
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to
'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.'
[The Constitution] says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce
in the absence of any action by Congress. Nevertheless, as Justice Johnson suggested in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
231-[ ]32, [ ](1824), the Commerce Clause is more than an affirmative
grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well. The Clause, in Justice
Stone's phrasing, 'by its own force' prohibits certain state actions [e.g.,
attempting to require out-of-state companies to collect and remit applicable
use taxes] that interfere with interstate commerce.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
State Bd., 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981), explaining that despite the lack of federal legislation, challenged state actions may still violate the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the
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To determine the constitutionality of state taxing schemes, Justice Stevens
reaffirmed the four-part test of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.49
The Court then reiterated the vital distinction between the purposes
of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses 50 and concluded by finding a
"corporation may have 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as re51
quired by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus'
with that State as required by the Commerce Clause." 52 The Court then
conceded that despite more adaptable guidelines regarding the Commerce
Clause, there had been no suggestion to not adhere to indisputable
rules. 53 The majority concluded that a substantial nexus was absent beQuill Court acknowledged fewer restrictions on state taxing powers due to substantial development of the dormant Commerce Clause. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing P.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION §§ 2:9-2:17 (1981)).
See generally EMANUEL, supra note 46, at 69, 93-95 (explaining dormant Commerce
Clause issues and related state tax questions); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 312-15 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing taxation issues relating to interstate
commerce).
49 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310-11 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). A state tax meets constitutional muster provided the tax:
'[1 is applied to an activity with substantialnexus with the taxing State, [2]
is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.'
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1044 (6th ed.
1990) (defining nexus as "[a] multistate corporation's taxable income can be apportioned
to a specific state only if the entity has established a sufficient presence, or nexus, with
that state") (emphases added).
Further, the majority noted that concern centered on the first part of Complete Auto's
Accordingly,
test, which dealt with substantial nexus. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
Quill's Commerce Clause analysis also focused on the substantial nexus prong. See id. at
313. Because this threshold element was not satisfied, the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis ended there. See id.; see also Grierson, supra note 6, at 597 (concluding that
"[n~exus is always thefirst line of inquiry") (emphasis added).
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. The Due Process Clause protects the individual more
against a particular state, whereas the Commerce Clause focuses on financial effects on
the United States as a whole, resulting from various state taxation laws. See id. But see
id. at 327 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the four-part
test of Complete Auto remains rooted with due process reasoning; accordingly, a distinct
concept of nexus lacks justification).
51 See supra note 49 (defining nexus).
52 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313. The Court further explained that despite the Court's prior
comments [ ] suggest[ing] that every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause, it does
not follow that the converse is as well true: A tax may be consistent with
[d]ue [plrocess and yet unduly burden interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Tyler Pipe [Indus.], Inc. v. Washington State [Dep't] of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232 (1987).
Id. at 313-14 n.7 (emphasis added).
53 See id. at 314. Justice Stevens explained that any such burdens are outweighed by
an unambiguous law and the doctrine of stare decisis should be followed. See id. at 31517. Further, the Justice noted that a clear rule enables states to realize the outer limits
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cause of Quill Corporation's lack of "physical presence" in North Dakota. This, the Court asserted, prohibited the State of North Dakota
from imposing a duty on Quill to collect and remit taxes.5 4
App~ing the majority's "bright-line" rule to the hypothetical facts

presented56 also leads to a Commerce Clause violation because a
"nexus"

islacking.

New Jersey's attempt to require Elite to collect
and remit applicable use taxes to its state, without a "physical presence"

within New Jersey's borders, remains fatal. The only possible presence
Elite has in New Jersey is its reach of its web site via the Internet. But
this fact, given the language of Quill's majority, fails to rise to a level of
"physical presence" therein. Accordingly, New Jersey's collection attempts fail to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.

that dictate the extent a particular state may reach to tax. See id. at 315-16; see also William D. Townsend & Cheridah Renuart, 'Experimental' Was the Word for Tax Picture in
1995-and Is in 1996, 10 STATE. TAX NoTES 148, 148-49 (1996) (noting that in Florida, a
mail-order company's attendance during daily meetings held over various years failed to
establish a substantial nexus). But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 329, 331 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (proclaiming disagreement with the majority's continued
adherence to a bright-line rule because unfairness outweighed the convenience; further,
the instability in this area suggests stare decisis is inapplicable); Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 955, 958 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that the presence of a mailorder vendor was enough to require a collection/remittance duty; specifying physical
nexus only required something greater than least presence); Grierson, supra note 6, at
597 (concluding that resolution of the constitutionality of a state's ability to mandate nonresident sellers to collect and remit use taxes begins with examining nexus; the nexus
controversy, however, remains anything but over); Harriet Hanlon, COST Sales Tax
Conferees Discuss 'Nexus Aplenty,' 11 STATE TAX NoTES 559, 561 (1996) (explaining
that despite Quill's requirement of a minimum "physical presence" to meet nexus requirements, there will be states that continually attempt to locate an attributional nexus);
Harriet Hanlon, MTC Examines Making (Tax) Money On the Internet, 9 STATE TAX
NoTEs 408, 409 (1995) (explaining that the Internet makes prevailing nexus guidelines
outdated) [hereinafter MTC Examines]; but see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (6th ed.
1990). Black's Law Dictionary defines attribution as follows:
Under certain circumstances, the tax law applies attribution rules to assign
to one taxpayer the ownership interest of another taxpayer. If, for example, the stock of X Corporation is held 60 % by M and 40 % by S, M may
be deemed to own 100% of X Corporation if M and S are mother and son.
In such a case, the stock owned by S is attributed to M. Stated differently,
M has a 60% 'direct' and a 40% 'indirect' interest in X Corporation. It
can also be said that M is the 'constructive' owner of S's interest.
Id.
54 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
55 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
56 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (defining nexus).
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C. May and Should Congress Waive this Commerce Clause
Violation ,7
"Congress has plenary power ...[to] authorize state actions that

burden interstate commerce."

This rule grants Congress the power to

decide whether it serves sufficient national interests to require that particular companies collect and remit use taxes to the applicable states.5 9
The more significant and debatable issue is whether Congress should indeed waive a Commerce Clause violation in the context of the hypothetical facts proposed.6 °
Despite the various opinions advanced in Quill, the Justices agree
that the ultimate resolution may be determined by congressional legisla-

tion.61 In dictum, 62 the Quill majority explained that their Commerce
Clause conclusion was less difficult due to the underlying fact that Con-

gress may disagree and alter the outcome of the case.6

The Quill major-

57 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
58 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315 (1945)) (pronouncing it is no longer questionable that Congress may permit state
actions that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause) (emphasis added); see Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd., 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1980) (noting that congressional authority exists to authorize what would otherwise constitute state violations of interstate commerce, which insulates particular state actions from potential Commerce
Clause attack); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(explaining that congressional authority exists to govern local occurrences adversely affecting interstate commerce).
See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text. Accordingly, Congress
may decide that Elite Computers (and others similarly situated) is required to collect and
remit use taxes to the State of New Jersey.
60 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 61-71
and accompanying text (discussing violation of Commerce Clause given hypothetical
facts).
61 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19; id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (resting Justice
Scalia's decision on stare decisis grounds, yet realizing that the ultimate Commerce
Clause decision remains in Congress's hands); see id. at 331 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that Congress may indeed overturn the majority's decision).
Z See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary defines
dictum as the following:
A statement, remark, or observation ... an observation or remark made
by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule,
principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question suggested by
the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its
determination.
Id.
63 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (dictum). Realizing that Congress has the
final say,
Justice Stevens admitted that the legislative branch is likely more capable of settling this
issue. See id. Because of the numerous states that assess use taxes, the Justice explained
that a different opinion than that reached today "might raise thorny questions concerning
the retroactive application of [use] taxes and might trigger substantial unanticipated liabil-
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ity explained that the most intelligent decision may involve legislative
rather than judicial action. 64
Therefore, our hypothetical 65 Commerce Clause violation 66 may be
overridden by congressional legislation. Additionally, the Quill Court's
dictum 67 rings louder in Congress's ears given the wide ranging use and

issues presented by the Internet 6s and web sites. 69 Accordingly, conlitigation 70 and provides states
gressional action limits unneeded future
71
revenues.
tax
their much-needed use
II.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION72

A. Administrative Feasibility
Having established that Congress may authorize a state Commerce
Clause violation, potential administrative obstacles in assessing use taxes
ity;" id. n. 10, again conceding that the legislative branch may be the wiser avenue to pursue in determining this debate. See id. Additionally, the majority pointed out that its due
process decision no longer presented an obstacle to federal legislation. See id. at 318.
64 See id. at 318-19 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609,
638 (1981)) (White, J., concurring); see also Commerce on the 'Net Poses Knotty Tax

Issues, supra note 5, at 7 (concluding that the most logical solution entails some type of
congressional action); Hanlon, MTC Examines, supra note 53, at 409 (explaining that today6'5s computer age has made nexus concepts outdated).
6 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
For Commerce Clause analysis and conclusion, see supra notes 45-65, infra notes
67-71, and accompanying text.
67 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19.
68 For a definition of Internet, see supra note 2.
69 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing increased Internet use and
related issues); see also supra note I (defining web site).
70 See Grierson, supra note 6, at 589-90. Grierson stressed:
Information service providers should be forewarned that states will aggressively pursue alternative arguments in order to acquire nexus over outof-state sellers, despite the apparent 'safe harbor' provided under the
physical presence standard. States will argue that, given changes in technology and the imminent social and economic changes produced by the information highway, it simply is unrealistic to apply the physical presence
rule to information highway transactions.
Id. at 590 (emphases added); see also Caldwell, supra note 5, at 185 (explaining that
states plan to introduce modern, experimental nexus theories in an attempt to establish a
nexus for nonresident companies).
Further, Grierson explained that a mail-order business (similar to what Quill Corp.
was engaged in) and today's computer-supported businesses differ dramatically. See Grierson, supra note 6, at 593 (noting that unlike a mail-order company's limited connections with the litigation state, computer companies have uninterrupted state occupancy by
utilization of the Internet's network communications base).
71 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining and illustrating the significance of use tax revenues to the states that impose them).
72 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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must be considered prior to requiring companies to collect and remit outof-state use taxes due. The Supreme Court in Quill clearly expressed that
in the future Congress should reassess 73 possible legislation to aid the
courts in this complicated and ever-changing area.74 Although the Quill
Court's holding did not rest on administrative feasibility of requiring outof-state mail-order vendors to remit use taxes, the Court briefly touched
on this issue when explaining the procedural history. 75 Had no Commerce Clause violation been found, given the language used and context,
the Court
probably would agree that the administrative burden is not too
76
great.

Any alleged administrative burden, however, at the time the Supreme Court rendered Quill, is lessened today and will further decrease
77
Newly developed software will greatly ease
as technology advances.

73 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted
that
Congress considered past legislation to aid the mail-order dilemma. See id.n. 11 (citing
H.R. 2230, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); S. 480, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); S. 2368, 100th
Cong. § 3 (1988); H.R. 3521, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987); S. 1099, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987);
H.R. 3549, 99th Cong. (1985)). Additionally, the Justice explained that past congressional hesitance in enacting legislation likely was the result of deference to the judiciary
branch because of prior due process rulings. See id. at 318. But the Quill Court's due
process result openly invites and suggests congressional action. See id.at 318-19.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 303. Specifically, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that techSee id.
nological advances with computers have decreased administrative burdens.
Compare Brief for Respondent at *12, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 1991 WL 538776
(U.S. 1992) (explaining that computer technology would enable Quill Corp. to easily
comply with remittance of applicable use taxes) with Brief for Petitioner at *8-9, Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 1991 WL 538773 (U.S. 1992) (noting the unlikelihood of state
and local governments to coordinate efforts to rid potential burdens, and arguing that
state use taxes would create disorder if nationally adopted).
76 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (noting that the North Dakota Supreme Court's reasons
were guided by "'the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations'")
(citation omitted)).
77 See Grierson, supra note 6, at 597 (pointing out that companies currently can trace
Internet transactions by utilizing modern software); see also Amy Hamilton, Online Demonstration of Netscape's Tax Tracking Software Coming Soon, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 1613,
1613 (1995) (explaining that Netscape Communications Corp. and AVP Systems plan to
market use tax software in Internet based companies in the near future); Adrienne Redd,
State Expands Use of Electronic Tax Filing Again, 7 E. PA. Bus. J., Sept. 16, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8862642, at *1 (explaining that the Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue created the use tax software, which will be sent to companies at no cost). But
see Caldwell, supra note 5, at 186. Caldwell listed five potential hazards that currently
are confronting states that wish to impose a collection duty on nonresident sellers:
1. Businesses will not collect taxes, unless forced to do so, if the burden

of collection is too great.
2. Buyers won't pay use taxes if they are not asked to.
3. Businesses won't collect use taxes if they believe it makes their businesses less competitive.
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the alleged burdens of complying with the multitude of differing state and
local use tax rates.78 Accordingly, the current administrative feasibility
fails to pose an insurmountable obstacle to future congressional action.

4. Congress has no intention of requiring businesses without nexus to col-

lect use taxes. The last time this issue came to vote in the Senate (in 1995)
it was voted down by a 2-1 margin.
5. The Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the Commerce Clause ruling

in Quill.
Id.
Given the enormous growth and potential reach of the Internet, Congress should re-

consider the fourth problem noted above. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text
(discussing examples of prior congressional proposals within the mail-order context).
As noted above, the Quill majority agrees that Congress is free and wise to reconsider this issue. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Caldwell's proposed solution does not try to create new nexus arguments, judiciary or congressional aid. See
Caldwell, supra note 5, at 186. Rather, Caldwell suggests that state revenue departments
should collect from the individual purchasers. See id.
Caldwell's proposal has two required parts:
1. State collection of use tax from buyers.
2. Cooperative agreements among the states to implement voluntary vendor use tax collection programs. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut
already have similar programs in place.
Id.

Further, Caldwell explained the effects of such a proposal as follows:
1. Due to education on use tax payment responsibilities and implementation of easy methods of payment, buyers will no longer believe that purchasing from a vendor who is not required to collect use tax is a good bargain. Therefore lack of taxes will no longer serve as a selling point in mail
or Internet/on-line purchases of tangible personal property. When the purchasers realize that they have to pay the tax anyway they will no longer
seek out 'tax-free' vendors.
2. More vendors will collect use taxes due to the ease of collecting and
remitting the tax, as a customer service, and because of lessened possible
liability for taxes due to participation in the voluntary collection program.
Id.

78 See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1613 and accompanying text (discussing that
newly developed use tax computer programs allow Internet sellers to account for use
taxes throughout the nation); see also Sharp, supra note 5, at 38 (suggesting that a unified, sole statewide use tax rate might be possible congressional legislation).
Specifically, Hamilton's discussions with the chief executive officer of AVP Systems, Daniel L. Sullivan, revealed:
mhe [tax] software database [is] 'mind- boggling in its complexity,' can
track sales and use tax rates in more than 65,000 combinations of tax jurisdictions and determine whether a product is in fact taxable in each of
them. The tax master file includes all sales, use, and transit tax rates carried out to five decimal places for every jurisdiction in the United States
and for Canada's goods and services tax and provincial sales taxes. The
company's tax lawyers and researchers constantly monitor and update the
65,000 tax jurisdiction combinations; information on changes in tax laws
comes directly from the taxing authorities themselves. The system is able
to track and calculate the taxes largely through ZIP Code information re-
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B. Legislative Proposals
Having determined the minimal administrative burden with imposing
use taxes on nonresident companies, possible legislative proposals should
be addressed. Despite some disagreement that congressional legislation
represents the best answer to lost use taxes within the Internet scheme,
commentators agree that Congress represents a possible solution to this
ongoing dilemma. 79 As noted by the Quill Court,80Congress previously
considered legislation within the mail-order context.
The various bills proposed by the Senate and House of Representatives suggested three vital jurisdictional elements: that (1) the sale occur
within the taxing state; (2) such sales be purposeful and continuous; and
(3) a threshold annual sales amount within a particular state or in relation
to the country as a whole is met.81 Although these proposals have not
been enacted, they represent future8potential within the Internet context.
Senate Proposal 480, one example of suggested legislation within the
mail-order context, sought to legalize state taxation relating to purchases
of tangible goods by out-of-state dwellers.8 3 Additionally, Congress
might utilize a "carrot-stick" approach.8 4 With or without congressional

quired of a customer before an electronic commerce transaction can take
place.
Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1613 (emphases added). Further, Sullivan anticipated that
most companies that sell via the Internet will implement such software to counter customers who solely make Internet purchases in the hopes of avoiding any use taxes. See id.
79 See Caldwell, supra note 5, at 186-87 (conceding that congressional action is certainji one answer).
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 n.11 (1992) (citing H.R.
2230, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); S. 480, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); S. 2368, 100th Cong. § 3
(1988); H.R. 3521, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987); S. 1099, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987); H.R.
3549, 99th Cong. (1985)); see also Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the
Equity in Interstate Competition Act of 1987, Hearings on H.R. 1242, 1891, and 3521
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 100th Cong. 25-26 (1988)
[hereinafter InterstateSales] (statement of Hon. George Sinner, Governor, North Dakota)
(testifying that the proposed legislation would bring local and foreign businesses on an
equal playing field and maintain a credible and fair tax policy). But see Interstate Sales,
supra, at 67 (statement of George W. Park, President, Seed Co., Inc.) (explaining that his
mail-order business would adversely suffer because he needed a multitude of sales to earn
a reasonable return, indicating that further costs will hurt profits).
81 See S. 480; H.R. 2230; S. 2368.
82 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining the similarity of past Senate
and House of Representatives proposals).
83 See S. 480.
84 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Prod.
Co., 486 U.S. 107, 118 (1988) (noting that a pure carrot approach gives states an incentive to act but does not discipline them for inaction). See generally EMANUEL, supra note
46, at 62 (explaining that Congress may indirectly achieve certain objectives by conditioning federal funds, which effectively acts as a "dangling carrot"); STONE, supra note 48,
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action, state collection proposals might
entail pure, voluntary8 7compli8
ance, 85 third-party collection officers, or mandatory disclosure.

Specifically, tailoring of Senate Proposal 480 represents a very viable proposal for Internet transactions, as it seeks to ensure that necessary jurisdictional elements are satisfied to comport with due process. 8
Accordingly, future proposed legislation might take a slightly similar, yet
modified form. 89 If Congress were to pass similar legislation, Elite Computers 90 would be subject to jurisdiction within New Jersey.
at 510-11 (implying carrot stick approach within Civil Rights Act context, explaining that
an incentive to desegregate federal funds would be eliminated).
In our hypothetical example, the "carrot" might be the federal government's promise
of additional state funds, provided that they require companies doing business within state
borders to collect and remit use taxes to the applicable states.
85 See Dotson, supra note 10, at 47 (concluding that voluntary cooperation
by companies in forwarding applicable use taxes better guarantees much-needed state revenues).
56 See Internet Symposium, supra note 5, at 576. Speaker R. Scot Grierson
explained
that another use tax collection scheme is referred to as "electronic cash or DigiCash."
See id. The design of this proposal is to enable the purchaser's address and/or credit
card number to remain confidential. See id. Only the third party beneficiary would know
billing data. See id. Implementation would entail states contracting with private third
parties who would be responsible for forwarding collected use taxes. See id.
87 See Dotson, supra note 10, at 46 (noting the filing of a Federal Trade
Commission
petition to require that mail-order businesses completely disclose use tax consequences
applicable to the sale). This represents a possible solution within the Internet context.
See id. It would simply require some type of on-line, web site disclosure prior to consummation of the purchase. See id. Although potential options, these state proposals
likel fail to be the best solution to ensure that states collect use tax revenues.
See S. 480. The proposal there suggested that jurisdictions meet the following requirements:
A State shall have power to require a person to collect a State sales [and/or
use] tax imposed with respect to the sale of tangible personal property if(1) the destination of sale is in such State, and
(2) such person [or corporation](A) engages in regular or systematic soliciting of sales in
such State, and
(B) during the ]-year period ending September 30 of the
calendar year preceding the calendar year in which the sale
occurs, has gross receipts from the sale of such tangible personal property(i) in the United States exceeding $12,500,000, or
(ii) in such State exceeding $500,000.
Id. (emphases added).
89 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing original
Senate proposal S.
480). For purposes of this Comment, the following proposed legislation utilizes the format and certain contents from Senate Proposal Number 480. See id. Additionally, please
note that changes from Senate Proposal Number 480 are indicated within brackets. A
possible proposal might entail the following:
A State [imposing use taxes] shall have power to require a person [and/or
corporation/partnership] to collect [and remit to] a State [use] tax[esl imposed with respect to the sale of tangible personal property [commenced by
utilizing a web site and Internet to advertise and market their respective
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Straightforward analysis supports this conclusion.
First, Elite
Computers purposely chose a web site9 ' and the Internet92 to market
products outside Oregon, its principal place of business93 and state of incorporation. Second, the facts unquestionably demonstrate that Elite's
operations were ongoing, systematic, deliberate, and purposefully directed toward reaching a national market beyond Oregon's borders.
These directed efforts were more than rewarded as sales from New Jersey
alone accounted for almost $5 million, which satisfies the suggested
threshold level of $1 million within a particular state. Accordingly, under this assumed federal statute, jurisdiction would be proper. Therefore, New Jersey could impose a use tax collection duty on Elite Computers.

III. CONCLUSION: CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY TO
LIMIT FUTURE LITIGATION

Congress should legislate in the area of state attempts to require
nonresident companies to collect and remit use taxes. Due to the potential negative effect of Internet sales on vital use tax revenues, 94 state arproducts in states other than that where they are domiciled and/or incorporated] if(1) [For purposes of determining subsection 2(A) herein, a court
should make its own factual inquiry]
(2) such person, [corporation, and/or partnership](A) engages in regular, systematic, [or ongoing, purposeful,
deliberate, etc.] sales in such State [utilizing a web site via
the Internet], and
(B) [a one-year accounting reveals] that gross revenues
[sales] from the sale of such tangible personal property
[within the State referred to in sub-section (A) above](i) in the United States exceeding [$1 billion], or
(ii) in such State exceeding [$1 million].
91 See Hypothetical, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 1 for a definition of web site.
93 See supra note 2 for a definition of Internet.
See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1149 (6th ed. 1990) (defining place of business as
"[tihe location at which one carries on his business ... service of process may be made
[here]"); see also id. at 485 (defining corporate domicile as "[pilace considered by law as
[nerve] center of corporate affairs and place where its functions are discharged"). Additionally, principal place of business can be understood by reference to commercial
domicile:
A concept employed to permit taxation of property or activity of nonresident corporation by state in which managerial activities occurred in quantity and character sufficient to avoid contention of nonresident corporation
that taxation of its activities and property located outside bounds of taxing
state amounted to deprivation of property without due process.
Id. (quoting North Baton Rouge Dev. Co. v. Collector, 304 So. 2d 293, 297 (La. 1974)).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing potential negative effects of
the Internet on state use tax revenues).
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guments to expand the meaning of "physical presence" will continue in
the hopes of sustaining a Commerce Clause challenge. 95 No longer is
due process an insurmountable hurdle; rather, it meets constitutional
scrutiny.96 In fact, in Quill's dicta,97 the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that future resolution of this Commerce Clause issue may
better be handled by Congress. 98 The Court's call for legislative guidance is magnified today by ever-increasing 99 Internet usage. 0 It remains
unnecessary to clog court dockets with additional litigation. Certainty of
use tax collection does not lie with voluntary citizen compliance.''
Rather, the wise choice is for congressional legislation, perhaps a modified version of Senate Proposal 480,1"02 which avoids a possible Commerce Clause 10 violation and ensures states their much needed revenues. 104
Gregory A. Ichel, C.P.A.

95 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that states' efforts to expand

the meaning of "nexus" will not subside, but continue in the attempt to redefine this context within the new Internet context).
96 See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text (analyzing Due Process Clause issue
presented by a company's single web site via the Internet).
97 See supra note 62 (defining dictum).
98 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1992).
99 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining the potential increases in Internet usage).
100See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19.
101 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that most consumers are unaware
of the requirement to pay use taxes).
ID2See supra note 89 (outlining possible future congressional legislation).
103 See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (analyzing dormant Commerce
Clause issues and conclusions).
104 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the importance of use taxes to
states' total revenues).
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[27:643

B
21

1996 Form NJ-1040 Line by Une Instructions

Line 39 -Balance of Tax
Subtract
Line 38fromLine 37 and cater t

result
on Line 39.

Line 40 - Use Tax Due on Out-of-State
Purchases
Ifyou wore a New Jerseyresident andyou purchased items or services
that were subject
toNew Jersey sales tax.
you are liable for theusetaxat
theraue of 6% of thepurhaseprice if:
1. Saks
i

has un beenpaid:
Or

2. Sales taxhasbeencollected out-of-Stat at a rm less
dam 6%
In determining thenetamout of use taxdue, sale a paid tocertain
other ates may be taken ascredit Usetax due20 days after the items
enterNew Jersey.
Use Fom ST-I en remit the useta on a more timely
basis
Form ST- 18isprovided in thisbooldetfor your convenience (in
thecenterof thebooker with other taxforms). You may phaotocopy theForm ST-I8 provided endmseit o rit us, a
throughout to yea You sborld know lhac
New Jersey does
have
m, e records isinoied by ot-of-Samz busieestos and does
bill cutomersdirctsy foArusetaxincluding penaltyand interes
If youowe useam andme rerning itwith Form NJ- 1040,enter de
amont on Line 40. If you owe na usetax, enter "0.00."

Line 41 - Total Tax
Total Lines 39 mid 40 and enter on Line 4 1.

Line 42 - Total New Jersey Income Tax
Withheld
Enter on Linm 42 thetotal New Jersey incometaxwihheld. asshownon
your W-2. W-2G and/or 1099-R stateocut(s). The W-2 mustindicate
the moun of New Jersey taxwithheld anddoc-State box munt
indicate thatde am withheld wasNew Jersey income tax. Enclose the
se copy of ecriwithholding a
(W-2, W-2G, 1099-R). EndeamiForm 1099-R with theretart only if New Jetmeyincome ta
wt withheld.
Do anotinclude on Line 42 amounts withheld asNew Jersey workforce
development partership find/umentployment insinmmibceuth eae sbaidy fSmdcontributioms
(shown on dheW-2us WD/UI/HC if combined.
or WD, UI mid HC,if stated separately) or New Jersey disbility insetmice(may be shown asDI).These ore notNew Jersy come taxwithholdings and may not be used escredits on Le 42. Soc insrucions for
Lines 45 ai 46 for more informaon on memo worliforce developmet

pa-ut-shfndA/uenpoymems insurancellilth care
subsidyfund
comiions mad/or disability insrrancecontribions.

All W-2suremrnnts must reflect yourcorrect social securitynumber for
thewithholdings to becredited. If thesocial security ntmbe is mising
or incorrect,you mn= obmin a corrected
W-2 from youremployer.
Only youremployer/payer m issue
or cotirc thisform.If you have
notreceiveda W-2 formby Febrtuary
15,1997, orifthe fom you received is incorrect,contact
youremployer/payer immediately.

Line 43 - Property Tax Credit
Ifyou satisfedthe eligibility requirements
(seepage
I8) and
you did not claim a propertytax deduction
on Line 35,you ae
ontited to a propery taxcredit Donotcomplete Lie 43 if yo
claimed a property tax dedudtonon Line35. If yoar grass
income an Line 29, Form N.J-1040.s $7,500 or less,make no entry
onLine 43.

Line 44 - New Jersey Estimated Payments/
Credit from 1995 Tax Return
Enmer
on Line 44 the total of
* Estismsed at payments
madefor 1996
* Credit aplied from your1995tax retirn
* Amount, ifmay,
paid toqualify form
anextensionof
nome
Oe'file

\

f youcbanged your naebecouse of marrage, divoce, em,.

sing yourformer
tme,
midyou -- de estiated ampayments
enclosea satement with yor retrn esplaiing all thepayments
you and/or your spoe made ftr 1996ad the nte(s) aid social
secuy number(s)
under which you male pay-cet
If yourspause died doting theyearand y estimtd paymmks) weemade unde thedeceased
spouse's
secialsecumty
nmnber and other payments
weremadeunderyoursoial
sectrity number,
youmint mselosea scamntr-with yourrern
limingthesoeil -eerrtynumbers,
andth umortMMS
subtsmed
under
each socialsecrity nmnber.

Credit for Excess Contributions to:
Workforce Development Partnership Fund
Unemployment Insurance
Health Care Subsidy Fund and/or
Disability Insurance (Lines 45 and 46)
You maytake redit for exces wordcfiocdevelopmest partnership
frud/imtployment insurarcenbealth
coresubsidyflid conributions
and/or disability inumrr contibmions withheld bytwo or morceploycrs. For 1996, he maximnm
employee worbmece
development
parmersip frmrdaereployment insestomr/lth coresubsidyfund
cmibution wa SI 1250, and the maximumerployce disability insrconribution was590.00. If yo badtwo more emiployrs eind
youcormibuted
r
do
hm do mrenmumtnou(s) youmust inclosea
completed
FormNJ-2450 with yourrnetn claimthe tdt.
eoinued
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New Jersey Use Tax
What s Use Tax?
Use tax occurs when goods and services (of tangible personal
property) arepurchased for usein New Jersey but sales ous was
not collected or des tax was collected at a rate less than the
New Jersey sales tax cute(currently6%). The purchaseris liable
for the payment of use tax al the New Jersey sales tax rate.

tax is another stote, you should submit
New Jersey.

1% use tax to

3. Some mail order companie are not registered to collect
New Jerseysalestax. When you purchase goods and services through the mail and those items are normally subject to New Jersey soles tax. use to is dueon the amount
of the sale if New Jersey solestax was not paid.

Some Examples of Use Tax are:
I. An item (e.g.. furniture) is purchasedout-of-State for use
in New Jerseyand no sale tax was collected. (Purchase
was made in a state thatdoes not impose a sales Lux);6%
use tu is due to New Jersey.

How to Remit Use Tax
Complete the UseTax Return (Form ST-18, below) and file it
within twenty days after property is brought into New Jersey or
report the use tax on Line40 of Form NJ-f1040.Eater ero on
Lion 40. if youhave no use tax to rporL Businesss registered
with the Division for sales tax purposes report use tax on New
Jersey Sales and Use Tax Returns(Forors ST-50 and ST-51).

2. An item (e.g., jewelry) is purchasedeet-of-State for use in
New Jerseyon which the stole sales tax collected was at a
lower rate than New Jersey's. Generally use tax is due
only on the difference. If you paid 5% state sales

Here is the New Jersey Use Tax
Photocopy Form ST-18 and use it as J

Return, Form ST-18, for your use.
needed throughout the year.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
USE TAX REMITTANCE

DIVISION

OF

TAXATION

PLEASEREAD INSTRUCTIONS
ON REVERSESIDE
PURCHASER'SNAMEAND ADORESS
(PRNT)

Socil Security

FOR OFF(IAL DSE ONLY

SELLERS NAMEANDADDRESS
(PRINT)

So'a
Feet'l
Seuriy
IehcbonNum~erAnson
0
rTAX
eco
or
Federal

1 AMOUNTOF
PURCHASES
USETAX
(Line I 0We_

3

CREDITIF ANY FOR
IN JURt
PAID
DICTION
OF
PURCHASE

Raw ifNecessary

IDENTIFY
TAXAeLEITEM(S)
PURCHASED

PRICEPAID

(See Osuer ile
-3)

$

af
of

4

AMOUNT
DUE
2 Less L-n 3

C)(L-n

(if more taxableItemswrtepercrased. attachrider)

(Carry ToIa o LISE 1)

ICERTIFY
THATALL1HE INFORMATION
ONENIS CORRECT

If you purchased Aly taae

5

2

Date

Items or serviceson which SalesTax wAs notcllecta

or was

WIle

atl atale

ass than 6%. 0en you Ae lablE for

Uric Tax ale rae of 6% of sie purchaseonce Credi lot any Sales Tax paidto 1orestat0esix rnsrceiduonsmay be taken. (See Irstlruions for Line 3)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING USE TAX RETURN
LINE )

(Form ST-18)

Enter the Tota Amounto all purdhasessutoec Aotie USe Tax.

LINE 2 - Mu"rp Lie I by 6% (06) and enter thearnountof Use Tax
LINE 3 - Entr c0e0t fo se

tax previously pat ONLY anlpurcases whee
Items
1011$0
or
were receid out.Odeof New Jersey
A. TAX PAID TO ANOTHER STATE AT S% OR HIGHER II eyou
pad Safe TAx m the purchase a
orem New Jersey rate 0 6% or
a ugher rate to anoer stale Orluridcton ani did eot take delivery In New Jersey. NO Use Tax i due New Jersey. No credit wl be
gvenfor he
s

payments on
0iems a1 servces delivered Int New Jersey or for waes paid i foreign conthesR

B. TAX PAID TO ANOTHER STATE AT LESSTHAN 6% - It you pae sals
6% and did no take deliveryIi New Jersey, Use Tax is due NewJersey
LINE 4

e oe the porchase
al less Mn ths currentNew Jersey rateOf
xiate

8n

fn1
Any diference.

Subtractline 3 from hne 2 and nter resulton ine 4.

MadMiem100) 10 Compe1leitill youi piayyeiI
KEEP A COPY FOR YOURRECORDS
For Informtion regatding the ST-1

0: Stote id New Jersey. USeTax. ON-26r. TranIan, N.J. 06606

aio its ontaileeon contact Oevusioeof Taxaton,Taxpayer ServiceBranch. Office of Communication.CN-281,

Trenton. N.J. 08W660281 Orcall (609) 58662200.
PRIVACY ACT NOTIFICATION
The Ta

ReformAct of 1976. PL. 94455. imodiied a 42USC 40fc)(2)(c(q. aunoleresthe use of social securiy numbers in tie adiistration 01 ale

low. The Drstori wel use the number lo tax accounil xOenitcaeon and tax armruaratlI

nCdcoeeceon
purposes.

